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The need to understand and assess the personnel management practices in the Portuguese public
sectorisjustifiedbyits importanceastheemployerofaboutonefifthoftheworkforceasawholeandof
the majorityof workersin some occupational categories. In this paper weanalysethe incentives linked
to public sector wages using the benchmark provided by the private sector.
1 We use comprehensive
micro datasets for private and public employees, collected in 1996, 1999 and 2005. This time span,
thoughrelativelyshort,allowsusto gobeyondastaticanalysisandpinpointsomefeaturesthatappear
to be changing in recent years. While the literature comparing different aspects of the private and pub-
lic pay systems is extensive, there are not many papers addressing this type of issues for Portugal. A
first analysis of this kind was made by Portugal and Centeno (2001) using survey data. Centeno and
Pereira (2005) studied the determination of wages in general government based on the same dataset
for 1999 we use, but without the benchmark provided by the private sector. This paper takes the
analysis further, exploring the datasets for the two sectors in several dimensions.
The article deals with two main issues. The first one concerns incentives linked to the wage level,
which are investigated mainly by looking at the premium associated with working in the public sector.
This premium is calculated by netting out the effect of the differences in observed characteristics of
workersfrom the rawwagegap betweenthe two sectors. It thus measures the inequalityin the returns
to those characteristics. We start by focusing on the overall premium and how it has changed for spe-
cificgroupsofworkers,namely,menandwomenandworkersinmoreandlessdevelopedregions,and
across different points of the wage distribution (Section 3). Section 4 concentrates on the employees
with higher education and, specifically, attempts to assess the public sector’s ability to attract and re-
tainthe best professionals.The issueis investigatedonthe basisof premiaandwagecompression,as
a whole and also for specific occupational categories. In this section, we also make some consider-
ations about howthe interaction of the public and private sectors in the market for highly-skilledlabour
seems to have influenced the way wages have changed.
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(1) Throughout this study the designation «private sector» refers to the corporate sector as a whole, also including public corporations. The terms «public
sector» and «general government» are taken as synonymous. 21111111111111 1The second main issue the article deals with are the incentives referring to individual motivation
throughout the employees’ career-span. Wage progression is an important tool to that end. In Section
5, we compare the typical advancement pattern of employees in both sectors. Additionally we gather
evidence about the importance of the workers’ (unobserved) individual skills in the determination of
wages. The article has two additional sections. Section 2 presents an overview of the data and de-
scribes the main features of the wage distribution in each sector. Section 6 summarizes the main
findings.
A final remark is in order. This article concentrates on incentives linked to wages. However, there are
other incentives, such as those stemming from differences in employment protection and social secu-
rity systems. These are very important, in particular as far as the sorting of workersbetweenthe public




Data for general government workers come from the Public Administration Census (Recenseamento
Geral da Administração Pública), and for private sector workers from the Quadros de Pessoal.
2 The
Census is available for 1996, 1999 and 2005, and the waves of the Quadros de Pessoal that are used
refer to the same years. The first source is supposed to encompass the wholeof public employmentin
Portugal, with the exception of military personnel, and the second one all private sector employees.
The two datasets have altogether over 2 million individual records in each of the years (Table 1). The
actual coverage of Quadros de Pessoal appears to have increased throughout the period considered,
in particular, between 1999 and 2005. This is suggested by a comparison of the number of records in
this source with total private employment (without own-account employment) from National Accounts
excluding the general government, which indicates a coverage slightly over 50 per cent in 1996,
around 55 per cent in 1999, and close to 70 per cent in 2005.
3 The actual coverage of the Public Ad-
ministrationCensushasalsohadsomefluctuations(seenotetoTable1)butthesehavebeensmall.
The datasets comprise, specifically, information about gender, education, age, monthly wage, hours
worked,years of service in the public sector or in the current firm, occupation, and geographiclocation
of the workplace.Wagesaremeasuredas the basesalaryplusotherremunerationsreceivedona reg-
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(2) The Public Administration Census is carried out by the Direcção-Geral da Administração e do Emprego Público. Quadros de Pessoal is a yearly survey
carried out by the Ministério do Trabalho e da Solidariedade Social. In 2002 this latter survey was extended to public employees whose employment
relationship assumes the form of individual contract, who were excluded from the dataset we used. 32222222222222 2
(3) The widening of the survey coverage is also indicated by the fact that the number of firms included increased in the 1996-2005 period, and the average
number of employees per firm has decreased from approximately 10 in 1996 to around 8 in 2005. 43333333333333 3ular basis.
4 Experience is proxied by the age, taking into account the years of schooling.
5 As regards
the location of the workplace, the only aggregate classification available in the two databases for the
three years takes the distrito (municipal region) as a reference. This information wasused to construct
an indicator of workplacelocation in more vs less developedareas.
6 Onlyfull-time workers(in general,
defined as those who work at least 35 hours per week) have been considered in the study, since most
of the results areobtainedonthe basisof monthlywages.We alsopresentsomeevidenceconsidering
hourly wages which - as we shall see - is very much consistent with that for monthly wages.
Data regarding the occupational categoryin Quadros de Pessoal followthe National Occupation Clas-
sification (Classificação Nacional de Profissões) of 1994. By contrast, the corresponding information
in the Public Administration Census is not shown according to a harmonised classification. In this
case, the presentation is mainly based on the categorization of employeesfor pay purposes and is not
uniform across the three years. A substantial effort was put into converting the occupational informa-
tion in the public sector datasets to the National Occupation Classification. Some categories of civil
servants, such as judges, doctors, nurses or teachers, could be easily classified because they corre-
spond to occupations set out in the National Occupation Classification. This is not the case of generic
categories, such as Técnico Superior, which overlap several occupations, like economists, engineers
or legal staff. A case-by-case analysis was made for them, taking into account additional information,
notably, the details about the service of the employee and, especially for the college-graduated, the
area of study. Due to the difficulty of this task, it was only carried out for 1999 (for all employees) and
2005 (for college graduates). The occupations take as a reference the National Occupation
Classification at three-digit level, in some cases aggregating more than one of those.
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Table 1
WORKERS IN THE DATASETS
Cross Sectional Data Panel Data
1996 1999 2005
Public Sector 548 397 573 904 523 358 289 272
Central Government 447 248 459986 445 932
Local Government 101 149 98 310 61 927
Regional Government n.a. 15 608 15 499
Private Sector 1 517 234 1 712 382 2 194 918 305 057
Total 2 065 631 2 286 286 2 718 276 594 329
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the Public Administration Census and the Quadros de Pessoal.
Nota:As far as the public sector datasets are concerned, local government does not have a full coverage in 2005. Moreover, data for 1996 referring to the regional government are un-




may imply some underestimation of public wages, but of small magnitude (about 1 per cent, on average, considering the figures for 2005). 54444444444444 4
(5) Experience is computed as the difference between the age of the worker and either the number of years of schooling plus six, if greater than 15, or 15. 65555555555555 5
(6) ThemoredevelopedareaswereassumedtobethedistritosofAveiro,Braga,Coimbra,Faro,Leiria,Lisboa,Porto,Santarém,SetúbalandVianadoCastelo
andtheRegiãoAutónomadaMadeira.ThelessdevelopedareascorrespondtothedistritosofBeja,Bragança,CasteloBranco,Évora,Guarda,Portalegre,
Vila Real and Viseu and the Região Autónoma dos Açores. 76666666666666 6The records in the databases identify the individuals, allowing us to trace the continuity of a given
worker either in general government or in a firm throughout the period 1996-2005. Hence, besides the
cross-sectional datasets for each of the three years, we are able to construct a panel dataset with
workerswhodidnotchangejobsinthat period(i.e. that remainedinthepublicsectororthesamefirm).
The panel is an intersectionof the cross sections for the three years,and it is interestingto assess how
the results drawnfrom it differ from those obtained using the full datasets, for instance, as far as public
wage premia are concerned. Such differences arise as a result of two effects. Firstly, the panel does
not includethe workerswhojoinedandretiredfrom the labourmarket in the decade1996-2005.We la-
bel this as the turnover effect. Secondly, the panelentails a selectioneffect, as it tends to select advan-
tagedprivatesectorworkers,aneffect that isrelativelyunimportantfor theirpublicsectorcounterparts.
In the latter sector, jobs are more stable and it is quite reasonable, indeed expectable, for an individual
to remain a public employee for his whole career. By contrast, restricting the focus to individuals who
stay in the same firm from 1996 to 2005 amounts to selecting more stable and possibly larger compa-
nies and workers who are doing well with the current private employer (in view of the fact that, on
non-wage grounds, changing jobs within the private sector is less costly than leaving the public). Fig-
uresin Table1 giveanindicationaboutthe magnitudeof the selectioneffect. For the privatesector, the
workersin the panel are about 20 per cent of the ones in the sectional dataset withthe least number of
observations, while this figure goes up to 55 per cent for the public sector.
2.2. Descriptive analysis
Chart 1 depicts the estimates of the density functions of monthly wages earned in the public and the
private sectors, in 1996 and 2005. Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix present some descriptive statis-
tics for this variable as well as the main figures summarizing the characteristics of the labour force in
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Chart 1
DENSITY FUNCTIONS FOR WAGES IN THE PUBLIC
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Sources: Author’s computations based on the Public Administration Census and the Quadros de Pessoal.
Notes: The charts depict the kernel density estimates using the Epanechnikov method; the vertical lines represent the average wage.the two sectors. Wage densities show a concentration of workers in the lower tail of the distribution in
both sectors, but this is much more evident for the private, as also indicated by the statistics for skew-
ness. The distribution of wages in the public sector has become less skewed in recent years and this
feature is also present in the panel. Such a pattern may indicate a quicker advancement pace for cate-
gories of employees occupying lower wage brackets
7. The earnings distribution in the public sector
has several modes, reflecting a concentration of workers at the steps of the wage scales correspond-
ing to the main categories of public employees. By contrast, the one referring to the private sector is
veryconcentratedaroundthestatutoryminimumwagelevel.Forthisreason,thedispersionatthecen-
tral part of the respectivedistributionis comparativelysmaller, as indicatedbythe ratio betweenwages
at percentiles 75th and 25th. The dispersion as a whole is nevertheless larger in the private sector (as
indicated by the ratio between the standard deviation and the mean). The average monthly salary in
general government is clearly above the one in the private sector, and this gap has widenedover time,
from around 50 per cent in 1996 to almost 75 per cent in 2005.
The distributions based on hourly earnings have, to a large extent, the features just described. How-
ever, comparatively to the results based on monthly wages, the distributions in the public sector are
shifted to the right relative to the private sector. Consequently, the public wage gap in terms of hourly
wages is larger by around 15 percentage points (p.p.) when computed at the mean wage. This is ex-
plained by the longer weekly working time in the private sector.
8
Considering the panel, the distribution of earnings in the private sector shows less skewness and dis-
persion, indicating a more homogenous set of workers. The wage gaps go down in comparison to
those in the sectional datasets, in line with the selection effect.
Rawwagegaps as given above can be a misleading indicator of wageinequality, as higher wagescan
bejustified,forexample,bylargerhumancapitalendowments. FiguresinTableA2indeedindicatesig-
nificant differences in this respect between the public and private sectors in Portugal, in particular as
far as formal education is concerned. The proportion of public employees reporting college education
approaches 50 per cent in 2005, whileit is barely over 10 per cent for the private sector.
9 General gov-
ernment employeesare also, on average, more experiencedthan their private sector counterparts, al-
though the difference is not very significant (2 to 3 years out of around 20 years of average
experience). This means that wages should be compared controlling for the stock of human capital.
Figures in Table A2 also point to differences in terms of gender between the two sectors, since public
employees are mainly women while in the private sector most jobs are performed by men. There is a
markedasymmetryinthe regionaldistributionof employment,withmost jobsconcentratedinmorede-
Economic Bulletin | Banco de Portugal
Articles | Summer 2009
61
(7) In recent years (2003 and 2004) there were differentiated wage increases in the public sector, benefiting workers with lower wages and this may have
contributed to the observed pattern. The same happens for the insufficient coverage of local government in 2005, since its employees tend to occupy the
lower cohorts of the general government wage distribution. Note, however, that the skewness reduction is already present in the 1999 data. 8777777777777 7
(8) Themaximumweeklyworkingtimeintheprivatesectorwasreducedto40hoursbylegislationenactedattheendof1996.Inthe1996data,whichdonotyet
reflect the effect of such legislation, approximately half of the employees reported a working time longer than 40 hours. In the public sector, the weekly
workingtimestoodat35hoursthroughouttheanalysedperiod,exceptforblue-collaremployees.Thispersonnel’sworkingtimewasreducedfrom40hours
to 37 hours in 1998, 36 hours in 1999 and 35 hours since 2000. 9888888888888 8
(9) That proportionis slightly overestimated in the generalgovernment 2005 data due to the less-than-fullcoverage of local government, in which employees
without higher education predominate. The figures for 1996 and 1999 show, however, very much the same picture. 10999999999999 9veloped areas, particularly in the private sector. These factors should also be controlled for when
computing wage premia as described in the next section.
3. A GENERAL CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PUBLIC WAGE PREMIUM
3.1. Empirical approach
In order to study the raw wage gap between public and private sectors in Portugal we use decomposi-
tion techniques based on wage regressions. Such decompositions break down the gap as:
The first term is the part of the gap that can be assigned to differences in the covariates appearing in
the wage regressions, i.e. the features of the labour force in each of the sectors. The second term is
the unexplainedwagepremium(or penalty),reflectingthe wageinequalitythat wouldprevailif workers
inthetwosectorssharedthesamecharacteristics.Recentstudiesapplyingsimilarmethodologiesare,
for instance, García-Pérez and Jimeno (2005) for Spain, Lucifora and Meurs (2006) for France, Great
Britain and Italy, and Melly (2005) for Germany.
We compute the wage decompositions using two methods: ordinary least squares (OLS) and quantile
regressions. In the former, the gap is explained at the mean of the wage distribution, while the latter
brings additional insight by explaining it at different percentiles of the curves. The decompositions are
computed on the basis of wage regressions ran separately over the set of workers in each sector. The
specification we use is quite standard: the logarithm of the monthly (or hourly) wage is regressed on a
constant, indicator variables for three levels of education (basic, secondary and higher – the omitted
categorycorrespondsto less than basiceducation),male genderandmore developedregions,as well
as experience and experience squared. For the OLS-based decompositions this procedure was repli-
cated for men and women(excludingthe genderdummy)and, withinthese groups, for employeeswith
workplaces located in more and less developed areas (excluding, in addition, the workplace location
dummy). It is worth noting that the OLS-based decompositions match exactly the raw gap, a property
not shared by the ones based on quantile regressions.
Throughoutthis paperwefollowtheconventionof definingthewagegapas thedifferencebetweenthe
wagesof the group with higher pay, the public sector, and with lowerpay, the private sector. The differ-
ences in returns are evaluated taking as a reference the characteristics (covariates) prevailing in the
public sector - see note to Table 2 for more details. This is arbitrary since one could equally define the
gap in the opposite wayand evaluate the differences in returns at private sector’s covariates. Thus we
consideredit appropriateto present(for the overallgapat the mean)the coefficientof anindicatorvari-
able for the public sector in a regression pooling the data for both sectors. In addition, using data for
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in the returns to the characteristics1999, we also checked the impact of the inclusion of occupational indicator variables on this
coefficient.
It should be mentioned that the results of these methodologies are affected by the omission of factors
explainingwages,if theyalsoinfluencethe sortingof workersbetweensectors. Thus, the wagepremia
we calculate may reflect, besides a «pure» premium, a preference for one of the sectors by workers
with certain (unobserved) characteristics. To formally address such an issue is beyond the scope of
this study, but we briefly discuss it when interpreting the results.
3.2. Premium at the mean of the wage distribution
Table 2 summarizes the results of the OLS-based decompositions for the full datasets in each of the
threeyearsconsidered.Recallthatwedefinethewagepremiumasthepremiumassociatedwithwork-
ing in the public sector. The first conclusion is that the raw wage gap between the two sectors pre-
sented in the last section is mostly explained by differences in the labour force characteristics. This
shouldcome as no surprise in viewof the evidenceadducedabout the latter differences. Nonetheless,
controlling for such characteristics there is an unexplained premium, implying that, for the same en-
dowments, wages are higher in the public sector. This is in line with the findings in Portugal and
Centeno (2001). Moreover, the premium has risen over the period 1996-2005. In terms of monthly
wages,it increased from almost 10 per cent in 1996 to 15 per cent or a bit more at the end of the ensu-
ing decade. Results for hourlywagesare consistent withthe evidencejust described,as the larger raw
gap is essentiallyaccommodated by a larger premium. With wagesdefined in this way, the figures rise
by approximately 10 p.p. in each year and the premium stands at around 25 per cent in 2005.
When one controls also for the occupational category (available for 1999 only), the premium de-
creases. This is expectable because unequal pay in the two sectors partly materialises through the
predominance of public employees in relatively better paid occupations. Results also indicate that
there is inequality even after this effect is taken out.
In order to analyse the documented increase in the wage premium over time it is useful to look at the
results for the panel, which includes the individuals who have not switched jobs in the 1996-2005 pe-
riod (Table 3). These results indicate that the premium has remained stable over the period, implying
that the improvement in the relative position of public employees in Table 2 is not linked to the workers
in the panel. In particular, such an improvement did not result from higher wageincreases in the public
sector comparatively to the ones benefiting employees that remained in the same firm. If it had, then
the premia computed for the panel would feature an ascending profile. The evolution in the sectional
data should thus reflect, on the one hand, the fact that job switchers had a particularly small rise (or,
perhaps, a reduction) in wages. On the other hand, it may also result from the fact that the public pre-
mium is higher for workers who entered the labour market than for those who left it during the period
under analysis. In Section 4 we focus on this point as far as college-educated employees are
concerned, as the widening of the premium over the decade chiefly occurred for them.
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Raw gap Wage premium Differential in
characteristics
Raw gap Wage premium Differential in
characteristics
Raw gap Wage premium Differential in
characteristics
Overall 44.9 8.6 36.3 51.8 14.5 37.3 56.3 16.9 39.4
Government indicator variable
(a) 9.4 13.2 14.9
Government indicator variable (with occupation)
(b) 9.2
Men 29.3 -2.6 31.9 36.5 5.1 31.5 47.0 6.2 40.8
More developed regions 31.4 -6.7 38.1 35.1 1.0 34.1 45.8 3.3 42.5
Less developed regions 46.9 17.9 29.0 57.2 27.2 29.9 62.2 25.8 36.5
Women 64.9 19.4 45.5 70.5 23.8 46.7 68.6 24.3 44.3
More developed regions 64.1 15.5 48.5 69.1 20.9 48.2 67.2 22.0 45.2
Less developed regions 80.8 50.4 30.4 87.7 48.6 39.1 82.3 42.6 39.7
Overall - hourly wage 57.0 17.7 39.3 61.5 22.4 39.1 67.6 26.3 41.3
Government indicator variable
(a) 18.8 21.3 25.0
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes:Thedecompositions aregivenby     
pub priv pub pub priv priv pub pub priv             










Raw gap Wage premium Differential in
characteristics
Raw gap Wage premium Differential in
characteristics
Raw gap Wage premium Differential in
characteristics
Overall 41.2 6.6 34.5 44.6 8.4 36.3 49.0 8.1 40.8
Men 31.6 -6.2 37.8 35.1 -3.0 38.1 36.5 -3.6 40.1
More developed regions 34.5 -9.7 44.2 34.4 -5.8 40.3 37.3 -7.0 44.2
Less developed regions 44.5 6.9 37.6 51.0 12.4 38.7 52.3 9.9 42.4
Women 60.8 17.3 43.4 60.9 15.5 45.4 61.4 12.3 49.1
More developed regions 56.5 12.0 44.5 59.4 12.5 47.0 65.3 13.0 52.3
Less developed regions 71.7 41.6 30.1 76.3 39.2 37.1 79.3 34.4 44.9
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Same as note to Table 2. The number of observations is 576668.The results based on the panel also imply that the public sector was accompanied by the private in the
wage growth contention implemented in the post-2002 years, otherwise the relative position of public
workersin the panelwouldhave worsened.There are some factors that, in broadterms, mayhave lim-
ited wage growth in the private sector in recent years. Firstly, in this sector the unionisation rate has
sharply decreased, which tends to undermine the bargaining strength of unions and their success in
improving pay conditions. According to Cerdeira (2004), the average unionisation rate for the years
1991-95, in comparison to 1979-84, went down from 61 to 31 per cent and 60 to 38 per cent, respec-
tively, in the secondary and tertiary sectors as a whole. For government employees this indicator re-
mained relatively more stable, falling from 56 to 45 per cent.
10 The increased international competition
faced by some private industries also tends to limit the extent to which they can afford to pay higher
wages.
There is a data issue that may contribute to increase the public premium as measured in our results.
This is the abovementioned fact that the coverage of the datasets for the private sector got fuller over
time. Indeed, the enlargementof the base of the Quadros de Pessoal wasbasicallymade by means of
the inclusion of more smaller firms, which typically feature a wage penalty .
There are substantial differences according to gender and location of the workplace (Table 2). Taking
thefiguresobtainedfromtheOLSdecompositionfor2005,thepremiumrangesfromaround3percent
for males working in more developed areas (who in 1996 still had a penalty) to over 40 per cent for fe-
males in less developed regions. In general, there is a clear tendency for differences in pay between
men and women and between more and less developed regions to appear attenuated in the public
sector. This is explained by the fact that public wagesare set nationwide,using a common wagescale
for all employees of a given category, regardless of gender and region. In terms of the dichotomy be-
tweenmore and less developedregions,results indicatethat the publicsector does not have the same
level of flexibility to respond to local economic conditions as firms have. As a matter of fact, in broad
terms, the public sector activity is framed by equity and redistributive constraints that prevail over
profit-maximizationgoals. Payuniformityin this sector has redistributive effects among regions and, in
that regard, it may serve public policy purposes.
The evolution of the public premium by group in the sectional datasets deviates from the general ten-
dency only in the case of women working in less developed areas, for whom the indicator goes down
between 1996 and 2005. Since such a decrease also shows up in the panel, it appears to stem from a
quicker growth of this group’s wages in the private sector.
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(10) According to the OECD Labout Market Database, figures for the period after 1995 do not indicate a further decline in the global unionisation rate, but the
evolution by activities is not available. 111010101010101010101010 103.3. Premium across the wage distribution
Chart 2 displays the decompositions based on quantile regressions for the sectional datasets. It
shows, in the first place, that the public premium is not invariant to the point of the distribution where it
ismeasuredandthatit decreasesasonemovesupthewagedistribution.Specifically, in1996its value
wasapproximatelynil at the 8th decile of the conditionaldistributionand there wasa penaltyat the 9th.
Thought relatively less marked, the same profile is present in the 2005 data. Such evidence is consis-
tent, in particular, with the fact that the premium tends to be larger for less-educated workers than for
their counterparts with higher education (the explained part of the raw gap also rises across the distri-
bution of earnings, as it is mostly related to education endowments). The chart also shows that the
conditional wage distribution is more compressed for workers in the public sector
11, a fact coherent
with a greater rigidity of the wage setting. In particular, the existence of common wage scales for a
broadrangeof occupationsinthe wagecurve, as it happenswiththe carreirasdoregimegeral, is likely
to contribute to that result.
The second aspect arising from the chart is that the shrinkage of the wage premium across the distri-
butionislessobviousin2005thanin1996.The riseintherelativewagebetweenthepublicandthepri-
vate sectors evaluated at the mean, documented in Table 2, is thus mostly associated with increases
at the upper part of the distribution, although there is a slight increase at the lower quantiles as well. In
contrast, the profile of decrease in premia when one moves up the wage distribution remains approxi-
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Chart 2
DECOMPOSITIONS BASED ON QUANTILE
REGRESSIONS - 1996



































































Notes: The decompositions are given by           
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th of the distribution of log wages resulting ifthe covariates fromsector  j
J  were associated with the coefficients
fromsector  i
i  ,i j pub priv ,,  .thetextforthecovariates.Thecoefficientswereobtainedusingquantileregressions.Thedecompositionwascomputedusingarandomsampleof
50 000 workers of each sector, as in Machado and Mata (2005), using the variant presented in Albrecht et al. (2003).
(11) The difference between the premium at upper and lower quantiles of the conditional wage distribution gives an indication of the relative compression of
wages in the two sectors, since it may be rewritten as the difference in the amplitudes between the upper and lower quantiles in each sector. 121111111111111111111111 11mately stable over time in the panel (not shown).This is in line with the alreadymentioned fact that the
variation of the premia in the 1996-2005 period is associated with the wage evolution for college-edu-
cated employees, particularly those at the beginning of the employment spell.
4. HIGHLY-SKILLED WORKERS: IS THE PUBLIC SECTOR COMPETITIVE
VIS-A-VIS THE PRIVATE SECTOR?
4.1. General trends
We estimated wage regressions similar to those presented in the previous section (see note to Chart
3) considering college-educated workers only. Charts 3 and 4 depict the estimated coefficient of the
public sector indicator variable in quantile regressions, at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles, and the
least squares estimate for the sectional and panel datasets, respectively. In the first case, two addi-
tional subgroups of workers are considered: those whose experience was over 26 years in 1996 and
those with less than 10 years of experience in 2005. These two subgroups broadly correspond to the
turnover during the period and the results for them are important to reconcile the evidence for the two
datasets. Moreover, the results for the second group allow the assessment of the relative entry-level
pay conditions between sectors currently prevailing in the labour market for college-educated
employees.
In the cross-sections, the relative position of public sector workers considerably improved over
1996-2005, with the respective conditional distribution of earnings shifting progressively to the right in
comparison with that for the private sector. While in 1996 there was a penalty associated with working
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Chart 3
PUBLIC WAGE PREMIA FOR EMPLOYEES WITH








































Notes: Coefficient of the indicator variable for the public sector in a regression of log
wages (monthly) on a constant, experience and experience squared, and indicator vari-
ables for male gender, jobs located in more developed areas and public sector. Number
ofobservations: 261259 in1996, 332724 in1999 and477497 in2005. Theestimatesare
significant at the 1 per cent level.
Chart 4
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Notes: Regressions specified in the same way as in Chart 3. Number of observations:
127736 in1996,135720 in1999and146336 in2005.Theestimatesaresignificantatthe
1 per cent level.inthepublicsectoralreadyatthemedianofthedistribution,thisregionisapproximatelyconfinedtothe
last quartile in 2005. By contrast, for the panel there is a wage penalty associated with the civil service
exceptroughlyat thelowerquartiles,andthelevelis ratherstable.As intheprevioussection,thereis a
different evolution of the premium depending on the dataset used, but the magnitude of its increase is
more substantial in the cross sections. Such an increase stands now close to 15 p.p. compared with 5
to 7 p.p. for allworkers(Table2). The first andthe last sets of barsinChart3 illustrateanimportant rea-
son why the premium is rising for college graduates: the figure for those who joined the labour market
is clearly above that for those who left it during the period considered.
The evidence presented suggests an ascending trend in the relative wage betweenthe public and pri-
vate sectors for entrants withadvancededucation.We collectedfurther evidenceon this issuebylook-
ing at the premium for employees with less than 10 years of experience at the mean of the earnings
distribution at different points in time. For 2005, the figure appears in Chart 3 (last set of bars) and it
stands at approximately 19 per cent. The same calculations on the basis of the 1996 data, i.e. for en-
trants between the mid-eighties and mid-nineties, yield a premium of around 4 per cent. We do not
have a dataset collected around the mid-eighties that would provide information about starters in the
preceding decade. However, we do have indirect information inferred by looking at those who in 1996
had10yearsor more andless than20yearsof experience.In this case, the figuregoesdownto a pen-
alty of about 7 per cent. This figure will of course reflect, besides the conditions at entry, the subse-
quent evolution of wages. The evidence presented in the next section indicates that career
advancement is quicker in the private sector and thus the entry-level penalty could be smaller. Never-
theless, it seems reasonable to conclude that there has been an increase in the premium at the begin-
ning of the career, in spite of the decrease in the relative importance of government as an employer of
collegegraduates. Such relevancehas come downas a result of the gradualstabilizationof the size of
the public sector and, more recently, of the enhancement of budgetary constraints. It is possible to get
an approximateideaabouthowthe allocationof entrants withadvanceddegreesbetweenthe twosec-
tors has evolved by looking at their proportion in each sector, by experience cohorts. In the dataset for
2005, the public sector employsroughly30 per cent of collegegraduateswith10 or less yearsof expe-
rience, over 50 per cent of those reporting between 10 and 20 years of experience and around 70 per
cent of graduates with 20 to 30 years of experience.
12
Takentogether, thesepiecesof evidenceoffer some insightinto the waypublicandprivatelabourmar-
kets in Portugal have interacted. They indicate that the relative public/private wages are largely unre-
sponsive to the sorting of workers between the two sectors. In the past, the public sector was paying
relatively less when it was hiring relatively more, and vice-versa in recent years. Such an evidence
should stem, firstly, from the fact that wages in the private sector respond to market conditions whilst
public wages are more rigid and stable. Given the rapid growth in the number of college graduates
coming to the market and the slowdownin recruitment by the public sector, firms had to compete less
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(12) This only gives an approximate indication since more experienced workers may not have joined the sector where they are now at the beginning of their
careers, but moved later. As the flow of workers is presumably more important from the private to the public sector than the opposite, the figures may
somewhat overstate the actual proportion of entrants into general government in the past. Nevertheless, taking into account the fact that sector switching
typically occurs when workers are relatively younger, the distortion may not be all that substantial. 131212121212121212121212 12for highly-skilledlabour and are likely to have adjusted the entry points downwards.An analysis by oc-
cupationmadebelowshowsan increasein the premiumfor jobs in whichthe twosectors are important
employers. Moreover, part of the additional supply of college-graduated labour that was accommo-
dated by private employersoccupies worse-paid jobs, traditionallyperformed by workerswithinterme-
diate to low education. This is indicated by an increase in the share of those jobs in the employment
structure of college graduates in the private sector, from approximately 40 per cent in 1996 to 45 per
cent in 2005.
13 The evidence gathered also indicates that other factors on the side of the labour supply
have played an important role, allowing, particularly in the past, a large intake by the public sector de-
spiteawagepenalty.Specifically,theattractivenessofpublicjobs,duetoaspectssuchasemployment
protectionandearlierretirement,appearsto haveinfluencedthebehaviourof laboursupplyinterms of
selecting preferentially into the public sector (equivalently, the premium does not provide an exact
measure of how workers value jobs in the two sectors).
Another implication following from this analysis is that the increase in the public premium for starters
does not appear to reflect a deliberate public policy aiming at hiring better professionals, but rather a
reaction of the private sector to an increased supply of highly-skilled labour. Note also that such an
evolutioncontrasts withthat for othercountriesinwhichthepublicsectorhashaddifficultiesto keepup
with the rise in the private wages offered to skilled professionals (e.g. the United States, see Borjas
(2002), and Great Britain, see Disney and Gosling (1998)).
The conditional distribution of earnings of college-educated workers is more compressed in the public
sector than in the private. This characteristic can be assessed by analysing the difference in the
premia at the 75th and 25th percentiles for each year (see footnote 11). Such a difference is smaller in
the public sector by approximately 35 p.p., a magnitude that remains broadly stable along the decade
1996-2005 and is similar for the cross sections and the panel. The higher wage compression is more
evident for the subset of workers with advanced education than when considering all workers (Chart
2). The room to reward differentiated individual performances is typically much larger in the case of
higher-educated workers, and government seems to make a much more limited use of wages to this
end.
4.2. An analysis by occupational category
Jobs for college graduates in the public sector are quite diverse and it might thus be expected that the
overallresults abovearesubjectto considerablevariationacrossoccupationalcategories.Wenowex-
amine this issue bybreakingdownthe data accordingto the NationalOccupation Classification.Some
jobs in the public sector do not have private analogues, among them judges, foreign office personnel,
criminal investigation personnel and security forces (recall that the military are absent in our data).
Thesewereexcludedfromtheanalysisnowcarriedout.The remainingjobsweredividedintotwomain
categories. The first one aggregates those for which the public sector is largely predominant in Portu-
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(13) Thesefigureswerecalculatedtakingintoaccounttheproportionofcollege-graduateemployeesintheQuadrosdePessoalinoccupations withcodes3or
higher according to the National Occupation Classification. 141313131313131313131313 13galalthoughtheyalsoexistintheprivatesector. This includesdoctors,nurses,universityteachersand
primary and secondary education teachers. The second category covers the occupations well repre-
sented in both sectors, namely, managerialstaff, engineersand life sciences professionals,IT special-
ists, legal professionals, social science professionals and economists (codes 1 and 2 of the National
Occupation Classification).As explainedin Section 2, weonlyhave comparable occupational informa-
tion for both sectors for the years 1999 and 2005. For these years, Table 4 presents the public premia
computed separately for each of the two categories as a whole, and for the jobs that are well repre-
sented in both sectors.
14 It is also possibleto find collegegraduatesin intermediatetechnical,adminis-
trative and personal service occupations (codes 3 to 5 of the National Occupation Classification). We
also present the premium computed for them (labelled as «non-professional»).
The most strikingresultcomingoutof thetableis thehighlevelof themeanpublicpremiumassociated
with occupations in which the public sector is the predominant employer, contrasting with a penalty for
those in which both sectors share the employment. The penalty is particularly marked for the jobs that
the private sector seeks most, such as engineers, IT staff and economists. In 1999, such occupations
featured penalties not far from 20 per cent at the mean and, despite an attenuation in more recent
years in line with the developments described above, they are still significant in 2005. This indicates a
limited ability on the side of the public sector to hire or retain the most skilled workers in these occupa-
tions. Added to this is the fact that we are considering only regular remunerations, while in-kind com-
pensation and fringe benefits are likely to be relatively more important in the private sector.
The high level of the premium for the predominantly public jobs may indicate that they are not fully
comparable betweenthe twosectors. Indeed, certain workersin the areas of health and higher educa-
tioningovernmentperformparticularlyskill-intensivetasksthat havenoanalogueintheprivatesector.
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Table 4
PUBLIC WAGE PREMIA FOR EMPLOYEES WITH COLLEGE DEGREES, BY OCCUPATION
Per cent
1999 2005
Occupations Proportion Wage Premium Proportion Wage Premium
Public Private P25 Mean P75 Public Private P25 Mean P75
Mostly public 96.8 3.2 56.6 42.8 28.7 91.3 8.7 33.6 27.5 13.6
Public and private 35.2 64.8 -3.8 -11.7 -28.7 20.7 79.3 6.2 -5.9 -25.7
Managerial staff 23.5 76.5 23.3 10.2 -18.1 14.3 85.7 19.7 4.5 -23.4
Eng. and life sciences spec. 34.4 65.6 -10.0 -17.5 -29.7 17.0 83.0 2.7 -4.3 -19.1
IT specialists 17.9 82.1 -9.2 -19.0 -34.5 15.5 84.5 -4.7 -13.8 -26.3
Legal specialists 75.7 24.3 4.4 -12.1 -32.7 64.9 35.1 10.3 -1.1 -21.8
Social sciences specialists 75.2 24.8 34.0 18.4 7.9 45.5 54.5 34.1 21.7 10.3
Economists 34.1 65.9 -6.7 -17.3 -36.1 31.0 69.0 -3.3+ -18.6 -36.6
Non-professional 15.1 84.9 -10.6 -13.6 -22.2 8.5 91.5 -1.3+ -9.3 -21.7
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes:Coefficient oftheindicatorvariableforthepublicsectorinregressionsoflog(monthly)wagesonaconstant, experience andexperience squared, andindicatorvariablesformale
gender,jobslocatedinmoredevelopedareasandpublicsector.Allcoefficientsaresignificantatthe1percentlevel,excepttheonesmarkedwith+,significantatthe5percentlevel.
(14) NotethatthefigurespresentedinthetablecannotbeinterpretedasabreakdownoftheoverallpremiumfigurespresentedinChart3,inparticularbecause
the latter are also influenced by relative wages between occupations, given that the occupational structure is very different in the two sectors. 151414141414141414141414 14The size of the premia might be expectedto shrink over time, as the role of the private sector becomes
progressivelymore important (as it is currentlytaking place in the area of health care). This has indeed
happened between 1999 and 2005.
15 Nevertheless, the relatively higher public wages in those occu-
pations are also likely to reflect the bargaining strength of the respective workers, arising from the so-
cial importance of the functions they perform and the role of the respective unions. In fact, all the
occupations in this group have specific legal frameworks and wage scales.
The tendency for less compression of salaries in the private sector is generalized across jobs. The
findings in this respect stand out for managerial positions featuring a difference over 40 p.p. in the in-
ter-quartile range between the two sectors. Such positions seem to occupy a much broader spectrum
in the earnings distribution for the private sector. Finally, public sector employees in non-professional
occupations have a penalty across almost the whole distribution. Within these relatively low-grade
jobs, private employers seem to have more room to reward the skills of workers with advanced
education.
Tofinalisethediscussionofwagepremia,weaddressthequestionofhowourresultsmaybeimpacted
by a preference for one of the sectors by employees sharing some (unobserved) characteristics that
also determine wages. Studies finding a premium associated with working in government at the lower
quantiles, as we do, relate it to more strict admission requirements in this sector (e.g. Bargain and
Melly (2008)). This conclusion is reasonable in the case of countries in which the recruitment of public
employees relies on nationwide examination practices (such as Spain and France, for instance). We
find this conclusion unlikely to hold for Portugal, where no such mechanisms exist.
The higher relative wage for private employees at the upper part of the distribution is often associated
withspecific characteristics of this group of workers.We cannot exclude that such an effect is present,
for instance, in the results for the upper quantiles in occupations of shared public/private employment.
An analysis of this issue would require a deeper investigation.
5. INCENTIVES LINKED TO CAREER ADVANCEMENT AND REWARD TO
INDIVIDUAL SKILLS
Wage premia are important indicators from the point of view of attracting and retaining workers in the
public sector. However, in a sector with full employment protection, these are unlikely to play a signifi-
cant role as far as the motivation of workers throughout the career spell is concerned. We now look at
other incentives that may be important in that regard, starting by the advancement prospects faced by
workers in each sector. We measure these prospects over time as the average gain in relation to the
initialsalary. Sincethe progressionpattern mayvaryaccordingto whetherthe occupationcorresponds
to higher or lowerwagecohorts, weseparate workersin accordance witheducational attainment, con-
sidering workers with basic education or less and workers with higher education. We estimate the pro-
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(15) Detailed figures by job within this subset (not shown) indicate strong reductions in the premia for the occupations in which the number of private sector
workersincreasedsubstantiallyinoursamplein2005(nursesandprimaryandsecondaryteachers).Notethatthisincreasemayalsoreflecttosomeextent
the fact that the coverage of Quadros de Pessoal became fuller. 161515151515151515151515 15gression pattern in each sector by including indicator variables for the years of experience, starting
from the 5th (given that in the initial years it is typicallydifficult to accurately estimate the gains). Thus,
the estimated coefficients capture the difference between the average earnings in the first four years
and in each of the following years over the employment spell, controlling for gender and workplace lo-
cation, as well as education for the first group of employees.
16
Chart 5 plots the wage advancement patterns in each sector for college graduates in 1996 and 2005.
The curves have the usual shape, indicating decreasing marginal returns to experience, which in the
regressions in the preceding sections was captured by the (negative) coefficient of experience
squared. The important point is that college-graduate employees working in the general government
have smaller wage gains vis-a-vis the entry point than their counterparts in the private sector. In 1996
the difference stands at about 12 p.p. after 10 years of experience and then remains very much stable
over the career spell; in 2005 the figures are a bit larger, featuring a difference in the gains around 15
p.p. after 10 years of experience and 20 p.p. after 20 years. The private sector manages to have a
faster advancement pace that should impact positively on workers’ motivation, even with lower wage
levels than the public sector (particularly in 2005).
For less-educated employees (Chart 6) the difference in the gains in comparison with the entry point
also stood at around 10 p.p. over the whole employment spell in 1996. In 2005 the picture is similar in
the first two decades of the career, but then there is an upward swing in the progression pattern for
public sector employees, who end their careers with a quicker advancement pace. We do not have a
good explanation for the change in comparison to the profile estimated using the 1996 data. In any
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Chart 5
ADVANCEMENT PATTERN FOR EMPLOYEES WITH
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Notes:Charts are based on OLS regression of log wages (monthly) on a constant and indicator variables for male gender, jobs located in more developed regions and each year of the
career span (from the 5th to the 36th). The coefficients of the latter are shown.
(16) Theprivatesectorasanemployerismuchmoredifferentiatedthangovernment.Indeed,intheformerwagesareexplainedbyfactorssuchasindustryand
firm size that have no counterpartin the latter. Thus, we couldhave controlledfor those factors whenmeasuringthe progressionprofiles. However, as the
point we want to make concerns the comparabilitybetween the two sectors, we consideredit appropriateto includethe same covariates. The outcome of
the regression in terms of estimated coefficients is not much affected, as long as the factors omitted are approximately uncorrelated with the covariates
included. 171616161616161616161616 16case, overall, this clearly suggests that the public sector could benefit from modifying the design of
wage scales, specifically by reducing relative wages between the steps occupied by entrants and the
steps occupied by more experienced workers.
17
Another important incentive in terms of workers’ motivation is their perception that wages depend on
individualperformance.It might be expectedthat, in general,workerswhosewagesare determinedby
some automatic rules have a weaker commitment to the job. In the public sector it is generally difficult
to evaluate employees’performance, given the nature of the services produced and the fact that these
are not traded in the market. Career advancement tends to heavily depend on experience.
The relevanceofattributesassociatedwithworkers’individualskillsinthedeterminationofwagescan-
not be explicitly measured, since these are typically unobserved. The covariates we have been using
measuregeneralhumancapital(educationandexperience),anddeterminantsrelatedtodemography,
geographyand occupation. However, we can assess the role of unobserved skills in wagedetermina-
tion in each sector by considering the unexplainedproportion of the wagevariability in the regressions
wehavebeenrunning.The greaterthis proportion,thebiggerthat role.Acaveatis inorder:thepropor-
tion of unexplained wage variability in the private sector may be attributed, to a certain extent, to fac-
tors unrelated to workers without counterpart in the public sector and that are not being controlled for
(see footnote 16).
Independently of the differences between the two sectors, an additional aspect that should be taken
into account is the fact that unobserved individual skills may interact with experience and become
more important in wagedetermination as employeesmove forwardin their career. Such an interaction
may translate, for instance, into the workers’ capability to acquire specific human capital. Therefore,
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Chart 6
ADVANCEMENT PATTERN FOR EMPLOYEES WITH





















































































ADVANCEMENT PATTERN FOR EMPLOYEES WITH
BASIC OR LESS THAN BASIC EDUCATION - 2005
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: Same as note to Chart 5 but controlling also for basic education.
(17) Theresultsobviouslyreflectthewagescalesinforcewhenandbeforethecollectionofthedata.Thesewagescalesweresubstantiallymodifiedbyrecently
enacted legislation. 181717171717171717171717 17we sectioned the data for college-graduate employees into 36 groups according to the sector and the
years of experience. For each group we estimated the usual wage regressions (see note to Chart 7)
and computed the coefficients of determination in order to measure the explanatory power of the
covariates (whichalso dependson the functional specificationused, that is the same for both sectors).
The results are depicted in Chart 7 for 1999 and 2005, the years for which information on occupations
is available for both sectors.
Chart 7 clearly indicates that non-observable skills are less likely to play an important role in the public
sector than in the private. The covariates in the regression explain about 30 p.p. less of the wage vari-
ability in the latter sector after 10 years of experience. The gap goes down as workers become more
experienced, to about 20 p.p. after 20 years of experience and then further to 10 p.p. towards the end
of the employment spell. These results should be interpreted carefully in view of the caveat made
above, but they are consistent, in particular, with the evidence about wage compression presented in
the previous sections. The pattern over the career span obtained for the public sector is more in line
with what one would expect, since it is compatible with an increase in the relevance of specific human
capital in wage determination.
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Chart 7
THE ROLE OF OBSERVABLE CHARACTERISTICS
IN THE DETERMINATION OF WAGES - 1999
THE ROLE OF OBSERVABLE CHARACTERISTICS
































































































Note:Coefficientsofdetermination fromOLSregressionbyexperience cohorts:1-4and5to36years.Regressionoflog(monthly)wagesonaconstant andindicatorvariablesformale
gender, jobs located in more developed regions and occupations.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The goal of this paper was to analyse the incentives related to wages in the Portuguese public sector,
using the private sector as a benchmark. The results obtained can be summarized as follows.
After controlling for observable individual endowments, public sector employees earn higher wages
than their private sector counterparts and this premium has risen over the 1996-2005 period. Such a
development occurred particularly for college graduates at the beginning of their career spell.
The premia vary according to gender and location of the workplace.Women (particularlyin less devel-
oped areas) attract a higher premium than men (particularly in more developed regions).
An analysisacross the wagedistributionshowsthat the public premium decreasesas one moves from
the lower to the upper quantiles, in line with the higher relative wages of public employees with lower
educational levels.
The rise in the public wage premia for college-graduate entrants is explained, in particular, by an in-
crease in the supplyof these workersdirected to the private sector, whichhas been accommodatedby
changes in the respective employment structure and a downward adjustment of wages at the
entry-level.
There is considerable variation in the level of the public premia across occupational categories. Occu-
pations in which the private and the public sectors share the employment feature a wage penalty, sug-
gestingthat the generalgovernmenthas a lowcapacityto attract the workersperformingthem. On the
contrary, there is a large premium in the areas of health and education, in whichthe public sector is the
predominant employer, partially reflecting the strong bargaining power of public employees in those
areas.
Public sector employees have a slower advancement pace than their counterparts in the private sec-
tor. This may impact negatively workers’motivation. There is also evidence that the reward to non-ob-
servable skills is likely to play a relatively less important role in terms of wage determination in the
public sector.
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Public Sector Private Sector
1996 1999 2005 1996 1999 2005
Cross-Sectional Data
Monthly wage
Mean (euro) 950 1 142 1 491 619 692 859
Mean 1996=100 100.0 120.2 157.0 100.0 111.6 138.6
Median/Mean 754 894 1 250 455 504 626
Median 566.2 698.6 897.9 487.0 533.3 693.7
Std. Dev. 0.79 0.78 0.84 0.73 0.73 0.73
Skewness 1.9 1.6 1.3 3.6 3.5 3.8
Std. Dev./Mean 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.79 0.77 0.81
P75/P25 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.0 2.0 1.9
Hourly wage
Mean (euro) 6.6 8.0 10.5 3.9 4.4 5.5
Median/Mean 5.3 6.2 8.9 2.8 3.2 3.9
Median 4.1 4.9 6.2 3.3 3.6 4.6
Std. Dev. 0.80 0.77 0.84 0.71 0.71 0.71
Skewness 1.8 1.5 1.2 3.5 3.5 3.8
Std. Dev./Mean 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.84 0.81 0.84
P75/P25 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.1 2.0 1.9
Panel Data
Monthly wage
Mean (euro) 968 1 202 1 663 644 772 1 042
Mean 1996=100 100.0 124.2 171.9 100.0 120.0 161.9
Median 809 972 1 358 499 589 774
Std. Dev. 557.4 710.4 968.4 456.8 550.3 801.4
Median/Mean 0.84 0.81 0.82 0.78 0.76 0.74
Skewness 1.9 1.5 1.3 3.4 3.1 3.2
Std. Dev./Mean 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.71 0.71 0.77
P75/P25 2.3 2.4 2.5 1.9 2.0 2.1
Source: Author’s calculations, based on the Quadros de Pessoal and the Recenseamento Geral da Administração Pública.
Table A2
LABOUR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS
Public Sector Private Sector
1996 1999 2005
1996 1999 2005
Experience (years) 23.4 24.2 24.6 21.1 21.4 21.8
Std. Dev. 11.5 11.3 11.4 11.6 11.7 11.6
Education
<Basic Ed. (%) 33.4 30.6 20.9 65.2 59.9 47.8
Basic Ed. (%) 13.8 13.7 11.3 15.4 16.4 21.7
Secondary Ed. (%) 17.6 16.5 19.8 14.3 17.1 19.9
College grads. (%) 35.2 39.3 47.9 5.1 6.7 10.6
Gender
Male (%) 43.8 42.2 35.1 61.3 59.1 57.9
Female (%) 56.2 57.9 65.0 38.7 40.9 42.1
Region
More developed areas (%) 82.2 82.5 83.1 91.0 90.5 89.6
Less developed areas (%) 17.9 17.5 16.9 9.0 9.5 10.4
Source: Author’s calculations, based on the Quadros de Pessoal and the Recenseamento Geral da Administração Pública.
Note: Based on the cross-sectional datasets.